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Abstract—Numerous recent studies have demonstrated how Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers can be fooled by adversarial 
examples, in which an attacker adds perturbations to an original sample, causing the classifier to misclassify the sample [6]. 
Adversarial attacks that render DNNs vulnerable in real life represent a serious threat, given the consequences of improperly 
functioning autonomous vehicles, malware filters, or biometric authentication systems [10]. In this paper, we apply Fast Gradient Sign 
Method to introduce perturbations to a facial image dataset and then test the output on a different classifier that we trained ourselves, 
to analyze transferability of this method. Next, we craft a variety of different attack algorithms on a facial image dataset, with the 
intention of developing untargeted black-box approaches assuming minimal adversarial knowledge, to further assess the robustness 
of DNNs in the facial recognition realm. While experimenting with different image distortion techniques for the purpose of determining 
weaknesses of the DNNs, we focus on modifying single optimal pixels by a large amount, or modifying all pixels by a smaller amount, 
or combining these two attack approaches. While our single-pixel attacks achieved about a 15% average decrease in classifier 
confidence level for the actual class, the all-pixel attacks were more successful and achieved up to an 84% average decrease in 
confidence, along with an 81.6% misclassification rate, in the case of the attack that we tested with the highest levels of perturbation. 
Even with these high levels of perturbation, the face images remained fairly clearly identifiable to a human. Understanding how these 
noised and perturbed images baffle the classification algorithms can yield valuable advances in the training of DNNs against defense-
aware adversarial attacks, as well as adaptive noise reduction techniques [6]. We hope our research may help to advance the study of 
adversarial attacks on DNNs and defensive mechanisms to counteract them, particularly in the facial recognition domain. 
 
Index Terms—Adversarial Attacks, Image Perturbation, Deep Neural Network Robustness, Artificial Intelligence Safety, 
Untargeted Attacks, Black-box Approach 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Recognizing the identity of an image of a human face is a 
relatively easy job for humans in most cases, assum-ing that 
we have seen the person’s face before. However, these types 
of image recognition tasks represent complex challenges for 
computers, requiring advanced classification models that 
process high-dimensional data inputs. In recent decades, 
advances in deep neural networks (DNN) have allowed 
computers to achieve or even exceed human-level 
performance on difficult image recognition tasks. DNNs are 
widely used today in several critical fields, such as bio-
authentication systems, autonomous vehicles, malware 
detection, and spam filtering. Facial recognition is one of these 
fields where convolutional DNNs are frequently used and 
generally very effective. Nevertheless, there are several 
challenges that accompany the benefits of use of DNNs. One 
problem is that DNN classifiers can be fooled by adversarial 
examples, which are crafted by adding perturbations into an 
original sample [6]. 
 
Facial recognition represents an interesting and impor-tant 
area for studying adversarial attacks on DNN clas-sifiers. On 
one hand, some users of social networks like Facebook and 
Instagram may be interested in being able to apply filters (i.e. 
perturbations) to the photos they upload that disrupt these 
social network services’ identity recog-nition algorithms, for 
reasons of privacy (e.g. preventing tag suggestions) or 
resisting state surveillance in oppressive 
 
 
 
 
regimes. On the other hand, social network companies, law 
enforcement, and various commercial interests may wish to be 
able to use image classification tools with defensive 
mechanisms that are robust to adversarial attacks, in order to 
reduce these attacks’ effectiveness. Wide usage of DNNs 
makes the problem of creating robust and secure DNNs even 
more important in safety-critical applications. We are interested 
in exploring whether there are any particular characteristics of 
facial recognition which seem to make adversarial attacks 
more or less successful in this area. 
 
Current attacks that have been studied in the field, such as 
those of Carlini [6] and Papernot et al. [10] have been studied 
as proof-of-concepts, where adversarial attackers are assumed 
to have full knowledge of the classifier (e.g. model, 
architecture, model weights, parameters, training and testing 
datasets). The strongest attack in the literature at the time of 
 
writing this article is Carlini’s attack based on the L2 norm, and 
it is a white-box attack requiring full knowledge of the model. 
Much of this research has been in-terested in developing the 
most effective attacks possible, to be used as standards 
against which to test the robustness of image classifier DNNs. 
With less knowledge of the classifier model, the effectiveness 
of the attack decreases. 
 
There is also interest in crafting attacks that assume 
minimal knowledge of the adversary regarding the classifier 
model, since in most real-world applications the adversary 
does not have access to the classifier’s parameters unless the 
adversary is an insider. Attacks that have been studied in the
  
 
current literature [1] [3] [6] [8] [9] [10] have typically used the 
MNIST and/or CIFAR-10 datasets as a proof-of-concept. Such 
standard datasets provide a common ground for dif-ferent 
research labs all around the world. However, there is an 
interest in using facial image datasets while crafting attacks. 
Use of face images in our studies can help us shed light into 
implications for current industry application areas where facial 
recognition is a central focus, such as tagging in social media, 
surveillance, privacy, and bio-authentication systems. In order 
to study neural networks in the facial recognition field instead 
of with standard datasets such as MNIST or CIFAR-10, we 
experimented with different sets of procedures to craft 
adversarial examples on a facial dataset and see how robust a 
facial classifier was to these attacks. 
 
We were able to craft adversarial attacks to face images 
which achieved up to an 81.6% misclassification rate against 
the classifier that we trained, using an approach that altered all 
pixels in the input image with alternating additions and 
subtractions to pixel values, while assuming nothing about the 
classifier. The perturbed images produced by this attack, while 
visibly altered, were still clearly identifiable to a human. In this 
paper, we discuss the different approaches to attacks that we 
developed, including altering single opti-mally chosen pixels, 
altering all pixels, or some combination of these approaches, 
and we compare results across these attacks. 
 
2 BACKGROUND 
 
We do not yet fully understand how the brain solves visual 
object recognition. However, in the last few years, the field of 
machine learning has made tremendous progress on 
developing models that mimic what the brain achieves. In 
particular, deep neural networks (DNN) using convo-lutional 
structures have achieved reasonable performance on hard 
visual recognition tasks. In convolutional neural networks, 
subsets of input attributes (in our case, pixel values) 
representing regions of images are together con-nected to 
nodes in subsequent layers of the neural network. These 
convolutional architectures allow the neural network to learn to 
extract “features” from the images to reduce dimensionality 
and focus on characteristics of the images that are useful for 
classification purposes. 
 
Input vectors to DNNs for image recognition represent 
matrices of values for each pixel in an image. In our study, we 
used a grayscale image dataset, so each pixel’s repre-
sentation was simply a single integer between 0 (black) and 
255 (white) indicating how dark each pixel is. In the case of 
color images, on the other hand, each pixel typically has three 
values for the three color channels red, green, and blue. The 
perturbations that we applied to images consisted of adding or 
subtracting from the integer values representing each pixel. As 
described in the following sections, alter-ing just one or two 
strategically placed pixels can reduce face classifier 
confidence levels substantially, however the task of searching 
for an optimal pixel, while not assum-ing any knowledge of 
model architecture or weights (only output confidence levels), 
is computationally highly time-expensive, given that there are 
typically thousands of pixels to test even for relatively small, 
low-resolution images, and each pixel modification requires 
another call of the classifier with the modified image as input. 
 
3 RELATED WORK 
 
Papernot, et al. [9] studied the limitations of Deep Neural 
Networks when attacked by adversarial attacks. Their algo-
rithms could reliably produce samples correctly classified by 
human subjects but misclassified in specific targets by a DNN 
with a 97% adversarial success rate, while only modi-fying on 
average 4.02% of the input features per sample. 
 
Then, in 2015, the same laboratory group devised a new 
defense technique called Defensive Distillation to prevent 
adversarial attacks [10]. Their “distillation” technique leads 
gradients used in adversarial sample creation to be reduced by 
a factor of 1030. Their study showed that defensive distillation 
can reduce effectiveness of adversarial sample creation from 
95% to less than 0.5% on a studied DNN [10].  
In 2016, Carlini and Wagner [1] tested three new attack-ing 
algorithms (CW attacks) and found that their algorithm tailored 
around the “L2” norm was successful with 100% probability 
even against distilled neural networks.  
Much of the related literature that we have reviewed, 
including the work of Carlini and Wagner [1], have used 
CIFAR-10, MNIST, or ImageNET datasets. In order to fur-ther 
advance this field of study in a realm with major practical 
applications, we decided to apply adversarial tech-niques to 
the facial recognition domain, to explore how these attacks 
translate to this domain. 
Different attack algorithms have different approaches in 
terms of how much they assume the attacker knows about the 
classification DNN structure and weights, or about the training 
and testing datasets used. Knowing more about the classifier 
and datasets allows the attacker to develop more fine-grained 
perturbations that require less substantial modifications to 
achieve the same desired misclassification effect. Such 
situations may be less realistic in most real world application 
areas, although insider threats could the-oretically represent a 
security issue in some cases (e.g. a Facebook employee who 
releases information about how to circumvent their tagging 
recognition algorithms). In our work, we focused on attack 
algorithms that assumed rela-tively little knowledge about the 
DNN classifier, taking a comparably more black-box approach 
to crafting attacks. 
 
4 APPROACH 
 
Our first step was to choose a face image dataset. We decided 
to train an image classifier on the Extended Yale Face 
Database B cropped image database, which contains 2470 
images of 38 individuals (65 images per individual) in various 
lighting conditions [2] [5]. Each image in this dataset is 168 x 
192 pixels and in grayscale, and we converted them into JPEG 
format (from PGM) for compatibility reasons with the classifier 
model that we trained. We divided the database into two sets: 
a training set and a testing set. A center light pose was 
selected for each individual for our testing dataset. These 
images represented cases which the classifier had a relatively 
easy time classifying, compared to some of the other images in 
the dataset that were more shadowed. The testing to training 
data set ratio was 1 to 64. 
  
 
Next, we trained a neural network using Google’s pub-licly 
available Inception v3 convolutional neural network model 
architecture [11] on this Yale B dataset. We used a feature 
extraction module in which the earlier layers of the neural 
network are first trained on the ImageNet database to learn to 
generate useful features for classification pur-poses from raw 
image data, and then subsequent layers are trained to produce 
classifications based on the features extracted for the specific 
training dataset provided by the user [12]. 
 
Training was completed in 35 minutes on a standard 
Google Cloud Compute Engine [4]. The publicly available 
open-source framework TensorFlow in Python was used in the 
training and testing process. The training and cross-validation 
process was completed over 5000 steps with a final test 
accuracy of 82.5% on the training dataset. The classifier 
achieved 100% accuracy in classifying the images in the 
separate testing dataset that we used for generating attacks, 
before altering these images. 
 
After training the DNN, we adapted the current liter-ature 
for our study by using Fast Gradient Sign Method to create 
adversarial examples with our dataset, but with the attacks 
based off of a classifier model from the study of Papernot, et 
al. [10] with identical parameters as in the study. Fast Gradient 
Sign Method assumes full knowledge of the image classifier 
model, including the confidence level of classification results, 
model weights, and parameters. The attack algorithm seeks to 
maximize the loss function of the classifier by adding 
perturbations in the direction of the loss gradient. We then 
tested the perturbed images generated through this approach 
against our own model to analyze transferability, and found 
that they had a relatively small impact on reducing our 
classifier’s confidence compared to other attacks that we 
developed. This was not particularly surprising, given that the 
perturbations were generated for a different model, by using a 
white-box approach closely tailored for that other model. 
 
After the adaptation of this attacking algorithm with our 
facial image database, we were interested in crafting adver-
sarial examples with less assumptions about the adversary’s 
knowledge of the classifier they are attacking. Therefore, we 
created our own attack algorithms in more of a black-box 
setting. The attacks that we developed in our study are 
summarized in the following sections. 
 
4.1 Approach 1 
 
To begin, we were interested in seeing whether there were 
certain pixels in the face images which, if altered, would cause 
a relatively greater change in the classifier’s confi-dence levels 
for the correct class for each image, compared to other pixels. 
 
For each testing image (168 x 192 pixels), we divided the 
image into 56 squares of 24 x 24 pixels. From each of the 56 
squares, one at a time, we randomly selected a pixel and 
altered its value by 128, mod 255 (“inverting” the pixel value, in 
a sense, since each pixel’s value is in the range from 0 to 255), 
and then ran the classifier on the resulting image. After testing 
each of 56 test pixels, we selected the one (in Attack A) or two 
(in Attack B) pixels that resulted in the greatest decrease in the 
classifier’s confidence that 
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Fig. 1. Approach 1 involved randomly selecting a single pixel from 
each of 56 squares overlaid on the input image and testing the 
result of inverting this pixel’s value on the classifier. 
 
 
the image was the actual class. The image resulting from 
changing these one or two pixels was chosen as the attack 
image. 
 
In Attack C, we used this same concept, but in an iterative 
manner, somewhat influenced by the Fast Gradient Sign 
Method. This attack used a greedy approach by first selecting 
the best pixel from the 56 squares and saving the resulting 
image from this one pixel change. It then completed a second 
iteration of the individual pixel testing process, again randomly 
choosing another set of pixels from the 56 squares and testing 
the effects of changing each of those pixels of the already 
modified image on the classifier’s performance. 
 
A downside of this approach was that it was highly time-
expensive to repeatedly modify and save the images and then 
classify the resulting images. The Attack C iterative approach 
(the slowest one, since it required classifying 112 modified 
images per original image) took a few hours to complete attack 
testing for all of the 38 images in the testing dataset. 
 
Summary of specific attacks developed using Approach 1: 
 
Attack A: Change 1 Best Pixel’s Value by 128 (Test 
56) 
 
Attack B: Change 2 Best Pixels’ Values by 128 (Test 
56) 
 
Attack C: Change 1 Best Pixel’s Value by 128 - 2 
Iterations (Test 56 + 56) 
 
4.2 Approach 2 
 
Next, we wanted to analyze the effect on the classifier’s 
confidence if we altered all of the pixels in the testing images. 
We considered this to be a more realistic real-world attack, 
since, unlike Approach 1, it does not necessarily depend on 
the ability to test confidence levels returned by the classifier for 
  
each image and class after introducing perturbations. After 
determining an effective magnitude of perturbation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Visual representation of the checkerboard approach of 
alternating between adding to and subtracting from pixel values (in 
reality we alternated for each pixel, so the squares would be much 
smaller) 
 
to introduce in general (based on empirical results in testing 
against a particular classifier), one could simply apply this level 
of perturbation against any classifier with the hopes that it 
could be relatively effective in causing misclassifications. Our 
task was to determine what levels of perturbation produced 
high rates of misclassification for our classifier, while producing 
images that were still identifiable to a human, and how large 
these rates of misclassification were in comparison to the 
previous more individual pixel-oriented approach. 
 
We began by altering all of the pixels in the face images by 
a small value in the same direction (i.e. making them all darker 
or all lighter by some small magnitude). We then iterated with 
increasing levels of perturbation until the resulting images were 
misclassified by the classifier. 
 
We found that when the pixel values were all modified in 
the same direction, by the time they were misclassified, the 
resulting images were often either whitewashed (in the case of 
addition) or shadowed (in the case of subtraction) to the point 
where they had become unrecognizable to a human. 
 
We then thought of instead taking a checkerboard-like 
approach, where we alternated between adding and sub-
tracting values from each pixel. This resulted in a grainy or 
pixelated image, but most of the images were still identifi-able 
to a human by the time that they were altered enough to fool 
the classifier. 
 
At this point, we experimented with different mag-nitudes of 
perturbation to try to find an amount which resulted in frequent 
misclassification while still producing images that were 
identifiable to a human and not blatantly clearly altered. 
Through an iterative testing process with increasing levels of 
perturbation, we found that about half of the images were 
misclassified after altering all pixels’ values by 30 or less, while 
others required larger magnitudes of changes. Five out of 38 of 
the testing images were still not misclassified after altering all 
pixels’ values by over 120. The few images that were 
particularly difficult to get the classifier to misclassify appeared 
to represent minority.  
groups within our face database, suggesting that if the 
classifier had been trained on a larger and more diverse 
training dataset, then it perhaps could have been more easily 
fooled in cases like these. 
 
We intuitively figured that adding some relatively small 
degree of randomization might further contribute to noising the 
images to decrease classifier confidence in the correct class 
while keeping them identifiable to a human. Therefore, we 
decided to randomize the magnitude of change for each pixel 
within some range, while still alternating between adding or 
subtracting for each pixel. We settled upon some ranges of 
perturbation to use in our final attacks based on the empirical 
evidence from our iterative tests of increasing levels of 
perturbation described above. Based on our results, we crafted 
attacks which chose a randomized magnitude of perturbation 
for each pixel either between 30 and 60 (Attack D), between 60 
and 90 (Attack E), or between 120 and 150 (Attack F). 
 
Summary of specific attacks developed using Approach 2: 
 
Attack D: Change All Pixels’ Values by 30 to 60 
(Randomly Selected Value), Alternating between 
Ad-ditions and Subtractions 
 
Attack E: Change All Pixels’ Values by 60 to 90 
(Randomly Selected Value), Alternating between 
Ad-ditions and Subtractions 
 
Attack F: Change All Pixels’ Values by 120 to 150 
(Randomly Selected Value), Alternating between 
Ad-ditions and Subtractions 
 
4.3 Combined Approach 
 
For one final experiment, we decided to combine the two 
general approaches described above by first performing Attack 
D (altering all pixels’ values by 30 to 60) and then attacking the 
resulting image again using Attack B (change best 2 pixels’ 
values by 128 after testing 56). 
 
Attack G: Dual Attack 
 
– Change All Pixels’ Values by 30 to 60 (Ran-
domly Selected Value) 
 
–  Then 
 
–  Change 2 Best Pixels’ Values by 128 (Test 56) 
 
5 EVALUATION 
 
For the purposes of this study, we sought to design untar-
geted attacks, whereby the attacker does not have a specific 
target incorrect class that they want the classifier to classify 
each image as, but rather simply wants the classifier to 
misclassify the image as any incorrect class. Based on this, in 
order to test the level of success of our 
 
attacks, we focused on two metrics: 1) ConfA : the percent 
decrease in classifier confidence in the actual class for each 
image after it has been altered, relative to the baseline 
confidence for the unaltered image, and 2) P ercentMisclass : 
the percent of images from the testing dataset that were 
misclassified after applying the attack. 
 
More formally, 
 
ConfA = 
ConfA(BaselineImg) ConfA(AttackImg) 
 
ConfA(BaselineImg) 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Graph of average percent decrease in confidence for actual      Fig. 4. Example of altered image using Attack F.  
class ( ConfA) after each attack 
 
where ConfA represents the classifier’s confidence that the 
image is its actual class. 
 
  
MisClass =  
Result
B
A 
 
Result
A
A+ Result
B
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where Result
B
A represents the number of images of class A 
that were misclassified as some other class B and Result
A
A 
represents the number of images of class A that were cor-
rectly classified as class A. 
 
A full table of the results we obtained for these two metrics 
for each of the seven attacks that we developed can be found 
in the Appendix. A bar graph of the results for ConfA for each 
of these attacks is shown in Figure 3. Altering just one single 
pixel of the input image (Attack A was found to reduce the 
confidence for the actual classes by an average of about 
16.2% across our 38 test images. In Attack A, we were only 
testing 56 pixels out of a total of 192 x 168 = 32,256 (about 
0.2% of all pixels) for each image, due to time constraints, so it 
seems likely that if we were able to perform a more 
comprehensive pixel search for each image, these individual 
pixel-based attacks could be substantially more successful, as 
they would be more likely to find a locally optimal perturbation. 
However, it was interesting to see that Attack C, which tested 
56 randomly chosen pixels and then another 56 randomly 
chosen pixels on the result from the first perturbation, was only 
marginally more successful than Attack B, which simply altered 
the two best pixels from the first 56 chosen pixels, without 
testing another 56. Both Attack B and Attack C produced 
substan-tially greater decreases in confidence for the actual 
class (on average, about 25.7% and 28.7%, respectively) 
compared to Attack A. This seemed to offer tentative support 
for a hypothesis that altering a greater number of pixels, while 
being less particular about which ones to alter, could be a 
more effective and much less computationally expensive 
approach to generating attacks. 
 
The attacks based on Approach 1 are time-expensive, 
since after altering every pixel, the resulting image must be 
classified and the change in confidence must be checked, 
 
 
and only after iterating through each test pixel chosen from the 
image can we select the best pixel to alter. Approach 1 rarely 
resulted in misclassification, but it did produce a significant 
average decrease in confidence that an image is its actual 
class. This approach is not as realistic in real world 
applications, since an attacker might not have access to the 
confidence levels returned by the classifier for each class. 
However, the approach is still useful for understanding how 
robust the classifier is to small amounts of noise in specific 
areas. We did not find any particularly consistent patterns in 
terms of which regions of the faces caused the greatest 
change in classifier confidence when a pixel from the region 
was altered. 
 
The attacks based on Approach 2, altering all pixels in the 
input image (i.e. Attacks D, E, and F), were substantially more 
successful in decreasing the confidence of the classifier that 
each image was its actual class, compared to the indi-vidual 
pixel-based Approach 1 attacks (i.e. Attacks A, B, and C). We 
experimented with various iterations of Approach 2 attacks, 
using different magnitudes of perturbations. As expected, 
greater values for the magnitude of perturbation caused worse 
classifier performance, while they also re-sulted in images 
where the perturbations were more visibly apparent to a 
human, since the images became increasingly grainy and 
pixelated with increasing magnitudes of pertur-bation. 
Nevertheless, with the checkerboard approach, even with the 
perturbation magnitude range as high as 120-150 in Attack F, 
the perturbed images remained, while somewhat noticeably 
altered, still clearly recognizable to a human as the same 
person as the original image (see the example in Figure 4). 
 
The Dual Attack (Attack G), which first performed At-tack D 
and then fed the perturbed image from that attack as input to 
Attack B, produced some improvement over Attack D alone, 
however it was not a particularly large im-provement (72.0% 
average decrease in classifier confidence for the actual class 
for Attack F, compared to 65.8% for Attack D alone), and was 
outperformed by Attack E, which simply increased the range of 
perturbation magnitudes to 60-90, compared to 30-60 in Attack 
D. Attack E achieved an 
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Fig. 5. Graph of percent of images misclassified by classifier (P 
ercentMisclass) after each attack 
 
average decrease in classifier confidence in the actual class of 
74.6%, while the even more substantial perturbations of Attack 
F (120-150) achieved 84.2%. 
 
In Figure 5, we present a bar graph of the percent of 
images which were misclassified (PercentMisclass) for each 
attack. 
The Approach 1 attacks (A, B and C) rarely resulted in 
misclassification of the input images. In the test runs for which 
results are shown in 5, only one misclassification was achieved 
through Attack B, and none for Attacks A or C. 
 
The attacks which used Approach 2 (D, E and F), on the 
other hand, were much more successful, resulting in 
misclassification rates of 44.7% for a 30-60 perturbation 
magnitude range, 65.8% for a 60-90 range, and 81.6% for a 
120-150 range. The Dual Attack (G) again fell between Attacks 
D and E for this metric. 
 
One thing we noticed was that there was a high degree of 
variability in the level of success of the attacks across different 
individuals in our testing sample. Figure 6 demon- 
 
strates this in the case of the ConfA results for Attack D. Each 
bar represents a different individual from the dataset. While the 
attack caused almost half of the individuals to have the 
classifier’s confidence in their actual class decrease by 70% or 
more, there were two individuals where the attack was almost 
entirely ineffective. As mentioned pre-viously, we hypothesize 
that the classifier’s robustness for these particular individuals 
may have been because they represented minority groups 
within our face database, and could have been in part due to 
the training dataset not being very diverse. 
 
This high degree of variability across individuals repre-
sents a possible weakness of our study. If we had time and 
resources to train an image classifier on a larger and more 
diverse facial image dataset, it seems possible that we may 
have been able to produce more consistent results across 
individuals in the testing dataset. 
 
Greater time and computing resources could have also offered 
us the ability to develop more comprehensive indi- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Graph showing variation in percent decreases in 
confidence for actual class ( ConfA) across testing dataset after 
Attack D 
 
vidual pixel-based attacks, testing greater numbers of pixels 
per image, and altering more than two pixels per attack. More 
experimentation in this area with larger datasets and analysis 
of patterns in the optimal pixels selected could yield valuable 
insights into whether there are certain regions of faces which, 
when altered, are more likely to fool a facial recognition 
classifier. Based on fairly anecdotal analysis of the pixels 
chosen by our individual pixel-based attacks, we did not 
observe any clear patterns in which pixels were cho-sen, but it 
is possible that a more methodical approach, and perhaps 
cluster analysis with larger datasets, could result in the 
discovery of patterns that are not easily apparent to a human 
observer when using the relatively small testing sample that we 
used in our study. 
 
A strength of our study is that we used iterative ap-
proaches to our attacks to attempt to find the minimal mag-
nitudes of perturbation needed to achieve misclassifications. 
While these iterative approaches would not necessarily be as 
feasible when attacking a real classifier in the wild, the results 
are useful for offering some tentative baselines for the amount 
of perturbation that may typically be needed in order to fool a 
facial recognition classifier. Additionally, the facial image 
dataset that we trained our classifier on included some images 
with very dark lighting conditions, and we used an advanced 
convolutional DNN model fine-tuned for image recognition, so 
we are fairly confident that the trained classifier that we 
attacked was a fairly robust facial image classifier model. 
Finally, we believe that our checkerboard approach to altering 
all pixels in our attack images was quite successful, in that it 
achieved high rates of misclassification while preventing the 
resulting images from becoming unidentifiable to a human. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
Through our experimentation with different adversarial attack 
approaches, we found that altering all pixels in a face image by 
a small amount (such that the image is still identi-fiable to a 
human) was generally more effective than chang-ing one or 
two pixels by a large amount for causing a facial recognition 
classifier to misclassify the image. Changing just one or two 
strategically placed pixels reduced face classifier confidence 
levels substantially, but typically did not result in 
misclassifications. In our test, modifying all pixel values by  a 
  
randomly chosen value between 30 and 60, in alternating 
positive and negative directions, resulted in a 66% decrease in 
the classifier’s confidence for the actual class on average 
across our 38 test images and a 45% misclassification rate. 
When we increased the level of perturbation to a range of 120 
to 150, we achieved an 84% average decrease in the 
classifier’s confidence for the actual class and an 82% 
misclassification rate. The resulting images from all of our 
attacks, while in some cases visibly altered, were always still 
identifiable as the actual person to a human. While our results 
produced lower misclassification rates than some other studies 
that have used more sophisticated white-box approaches with 
standard datasets, our results demonstrate that black-box 
attacks can also be quite successful in fooling image classifiers 
in the facial recognition domain. 
 
7 FUTURE WORK 
 
It would be useful to test our attacks on other facial 
recogni-tion classifier models to test for transferability. Just 
because they were relatively successful against the Inception 
v3 Neu-ral Network model that we trained would not 
necessarily mean that they would be as successful against 
other models. Models that have been trained on datasets that 
have been noised using similar approaches as our attacks, or 
models tuned specifically to be more robust to adversarial 
attacks would likely be more difficult to fool [7]. To test these 
attacks in the real world, one could try to upload images 
altered by these attacks to social media sites to see whether 
the sites’ classification algorithms would be able to 
successfully auto-tag them. 
One could also apply our attacks to classifiers trained 
on the MNIST or CIFAR standard image recognition datasets 
in order to compare results with other studies that have used 
these datasets, or trained on datasets from other domain 
areas, to test for transferability to other categories of images. 
An additional useful step would be to modify our attacks so that 
they can handle color images in addition to grayscale ones. It 
would also be beneficial to continue to experiment further with 
different amounts of perturbation or designing functions to 
calculate the most effective and minimized amounts of 
perturbation that consistently result in misclas-sification. 
Finally, applying individual pixel-based attacks to larger facial 
image datasets could be a valuable project for exploring 
whether there are certain regions of face images that tend to 
be particularly influential for classifiers and which represent 
good regions to target when developing adversarial attack 
algorithms. 
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8 APPENDIX 
 
8.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method 
Fast Gradient Sign Method is an adaptation from current 
literature, specifically from the studies of Papernet et al.[3] 
Figure 7(a) shows the person 1 before the attack, and 7(b) 
shows the adversarial noise generated by the attack for that 
specific person. Once the noise in 7(b) is generated, the 
algorithm tries to find an epsilon value to multiply the noise 
before adding to image on 7(a). Resulting image is in 7(c). The 
epsilon value is determined based on the breaking point where 
the image is misclassified. Same procedures are also applied 
to the person 7 in image 7(d). Once the adversarial noise in 
7(e) is added, the resulting image in 7(f) causes a 
misclassification for the facial DNN classifier. One important 
aspect to notice is that the resulting image looks almost exactly 
the same as the first clean image. Such similarity between the 
adversarial image and the original image is in direct correlation 
with the strength of the attacking algorithm. Another aspect to 
notice is that, in FGSM, the adversary is assumed to have full 
knowledge regarding the classifier. Such knowledge includes 
the model architecture, confidence levels, parameters, etc. 
One can say that the strength of the algorithm comes from the 
abundance of such information possessed by the adversary. In 
real life, most of the time, the adversary doesn’t have access to 
such parameters. The impracticality of the current proof-of-
concept algorithms was one of the main motivations behind 
this paper. 
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Fig. 7. Sample visual representation of Fast Gradient Sign Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. The original image of person 35 and resulting images from  
three of the attacks we developed, along with the confidence levels  
that the classifier returned for each of those images that it was person  
35. 
 
 
8.2  Results from Attacks   
Attack  ConfA PercentMisclass 
Attack A: Change 1 Best 16.2% 0.0% 
Attack B: Change 2 Best 25.7% 2.6% 
Pixels by 128 (Test 56)   
Attack C: Change 1 Best 28.7% 0.0% 
Pixel by 128 - 2 Iterations   
(Test 56+56)    
Attack D: Change All 65.9% 44.7% 
Pixels by 30 to 60    
Attack E: Change All 74.6% 65.8% 
Pixels by 60 to 90    
Attack F: Change All 84.2% 81.6% 
Pixels by 120 to 150    
Attack G: Dual Attack - 72.0% 60.5% 
30 to 60    
 
